ABSTRACT
Introduction
Recently, price contract models between suppliers and retailers with stochastic demand have been analyzed based on well-known newsvendor problems. Cachon [1] has reviewed models with one supplier and one retailer under several types of contracts. In a market, however, many retailers exist and they compete in order to attract the maximum number of consumers. In this context, Yano and Gilbert [2] have been interesting in contracting models in which the demand is stochastic and depends on price. Wang et al. [3] and Petruzzi [4] have studied decentralized price setting newsvendor problems under multiplicative retail demand functions. Song et al. [5] have analyzed theoretically the optimal prices and the fraction of a total profit under individual optimization to that under supply chain optimization.
In Bernstein and Federgruen [6] , they have analyzed a contract model with single supplier and multiple retailers and price dependent demand, where retailers compete on retail prices. Each retailer decides a number of products he procures from the supplier and his retail price to maximize his own profit. This is achieved after giving the wholesale and buy-back prices, which are determined by the supplier as the supplier's profit is maximized. They have proved that the retail prices become a unique Nash equilibrium solution under weak conditions on the price dependent distribution of demand. They, however, have not mentioned the numerical values and properties on these retail prices, the number of products and their individual and overall profits.
In this paper, we analyze the model numerically. We first indicate some numerical problems with respect to the theorem of Nash equilibrium solutions, which Bernstein and Federgruen [6] proved, and we show their modified results. Then we present Nash equilibrium prices, optimal wholesale and buy-back prices for the supplier's and retailers' profits, and optimal retail prices under supply chain optimization, analytically and numerically. We also discuss the properties on a relationship between these values and the demand distribution.
In the next section, we present the competing retailers model introduced in [6], and we discuss the sufficient conditions on the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash solution. In Section 3 we investigate the model with exponential and uniform distribution functions and with linear and Logit demand functions. In Section 4, we present numerical results and discuss the behavior of Nash equilibrium solutions and properties of the profits and prices.
Competing Retailers' Model
The model of competing retailers for one supplier and retailer introduced in [6] , is shown in Figure 1 .
This model is set under wholesale and buyback payment scheme. The supplier incurs retailer S , 1 i R  a wholesale price for each product, combined with an agreement to buyback unsold inventory at . We assume that the supplier has ample capacity to satisfy any retailer demand and produce products at a constant production cost rate , which includes the transportation cost to retailer . When and are given, each retailer orders his quantity and chooses his retail price . A salvage rate is adopted in the supply chain. To avoid trivial setting, the model parameters are chosen as and 
 is a random variable with a cumulative distribution function ,
The demand function depends on the whole price vector. It is supposed that decreases in p iand increases in p j for all j≠i, 1
, , , N y y y y   denotes the order vector of the model. The expected profit function for the retailer is given by
where . It can be rewritten as
From (1), the retail prices p impact on the profits of all retailers and his order quantity, however, affects only his own profit. In addition the retailer wants to maximize his order quantity. Then, the derivation of the retailer i's profit function given by Equation (1) on is equal to zero
Therefore, the retailer i's optimal corresponding order can be obtained from (1) and (2) by
This result reduces the no-cooperative game in the (p, y)-space to a p-space game. In this space the retailers compete only on prices (reduced retailer game). Then, considering the Equations (1) and (3), we get the retailers profits as a function of p only, as
where is the profit function with a deterministic demand
Bernstein and Federgruen 
: 
. following, the retailers t these um prices, whereas the s the beretailers and de k prices t
In the sell products a equilibri upplier knows havior of the termines the wholesale and buybac o maximize his own profit. This system is faces a random decalled "individual optimization". On the other hand, the problem of determining retail prices and quantities of products to maximize the entire profits of supply chain is called "supply chain optimization"
Determination of the Nash Equilibrium
As shown in Figure 2 , we study a two competing retail-
. We assume two types of cumulative distribution functions of demand. We consider first the exponential case and then the uniform one.
Exponential Case
The cumulative distribution function in the exponential , we get (
Then, using (7), we obtain
1) Linear demand function
The linear demand is given for by
. (8) we obtain the system of equations With this demand function,
The optimal order quantities and can be evaluated to
log ,
, the supplier profit function can be expressed as 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 log ,
2) Logit demand function
Now, the problem is studied with a logistic demand function, expressed by 
The order quantities are given by 
The supplier profit function and retailers' profit functio in the same way as for the linear dema
Uniform Case
The cumulative distribution function in the uniform ase is given by 
The inverse function of is g ven
The retailers' profit functions are given by
1) Linear demand function
With the linear demand given by (8) and , we
The values in tables are the optimal p for supplier, the profit for each retai m of supplier's and retailers' profits), optimal whole-sale and buyback prices for the supplier, Nash ilibrium retail prices and order es in paranthesis () are th function i rofit ler; entire expected profit (su equ quantities. The valu e total profit, optimal retail prices and order quantities for retailers under the supply chain optimization.
In the cases of Tables 1 and 2 , optimal whole sale prices and buybacks determined by the supplier give more profits to the supplier than retailers. In the symme- (in Logit case). The competition among retailers makes retail prices lower, which makes the fraction higher.
In Table 3 , the uniform distribution of demand is assumed with the symmetric production costs ( ( 1 2 , ) (30,30) c c  ), and the i a , which corresponds to the width of the uniform distribution, is changed from 0.1 to 0.7. It implies that large i a means the high variance of dem s are higher, d profits f the su lier and tailers d rease. This is because when the va ce inc es, the antity of order m t be in to apply t ation of demand, whereas the lso inc d to obtain pro its le W changes the optimal wholesale prices an buyb es for t r are almo e. Note that even it is c ared w result the exponential case shown in Fig e 2 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we first show the sufficient condition that unique Nash equilibrium retail prices exist and they are greater than wholesale prices. We then give the equations whose solutions are those re ples we compute these equilibrium prices, optimal wholesale and buy-back prices for the supplier and supply chain optimal retailers' prices, and discuss properties on these values. In future research, a two-supplier problem and other types of problems will be modeled and the properties will be discussed analytically and numerically.
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